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The Invalidation of Mandatory Cable Access
Regulations: FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.

Examining whether the FCC has the jurisdictionalpower to require the
top one hundred cable markets to dedicatefour of their channels for certain uses, the author traces the legislative and case law histories of the
FCC's jurisdictionalgrant of power from Congress. Analyzing a recent
U.S. Supreme Court opinion holding that the FCC does not possess the jurisdictionalpower to make such an order to the cable markets, the author
points to the growing need for broad and flexible powers required by the
FCC if it is to cope with modern telecommunication technology. Thus, concludes the author, the FCC order should have been upheld by the Supreme
Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent case of Federal Communications Commission v.
Midwest Video Corporation,' the Supreme Court of the United
States addressed the question of whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)2 had the authority to promulgate
3
rules requiring designated cable television companies (cable) to
provide channels for public access. The Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Byron White, held that the regulations 4 in
1. 99 S. Ct. 1435 (1979).
2. In 1934, Congress, at the urging of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, passed
legislation creating an agency with authority broad enough to govern all aspects of
the media. The legislation was passed under the authority contained in the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The FCC is guided by the broad Congressional mandate contained in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 and has
power to promulgate rules that carry the force of law. Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 151-155 (1937)). "For
the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges ... there is hereby
created a commission to be known as the 'Federal Communications Commission',
which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and

enforce the provisions of this Act." Id.
3. Cable systems are described as, "A video image is transmitted through a
coaxial cable from a central transmission point to interconnected homes or offices.
At no time is the signal beamed through the air." Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation: The FCC,the FirstAmendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51
N.Y.U. L. REV. 133, 134 (1976).
4. The regulations questioned provide that:
Any cable television system having 3500 or more subscribers shall comply with the following requirements respecting channel capacity: (1) Min-

question impermissibly extended beyond the boundries of the
5
FCC's authority.
The majority's decision identified the controlling issue to be
"whether these rules are 'reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting,' and hence within the
6
Commission's statutory authority."
imum channel capacity. Each system shall have at least 120 MHz of
bandwidth (the equivalent of 20 television broadcast channels) available
for immediate or potential use for the totality of cable services to be offered.
47 C.F.R. § 76.252 (1978).
Any cable television system having 3500 or more subscribers, shall comply with the following requirements respecting the number and designation of access channels: (a) Public access channel. The operator of each
such system shall maintain at least one specially designated, noncommercial public access channel available on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis;(2) Educational access channel. The operator of each such system
shall maintain at least one specially designated channel for use by local
educational authorities; (3) Local government access channel. The operator of each such system shall maintain at least one specially designated
channel for local government uses; (4) Leased channel access. The operator of each such system shall maintain at least one specially designated
channel for leased access uses. In addition, other portions of its nonbroadcast bandwidth, including unused portions of the specially designated channels, shall be available for leased uses. On at least one of the
leased channels, priority shall be given part-time users.
47 C.F.R. § 76.254 (1978).
Any cable television system having 3500 or more subscribers, shall comply with the following requirements respecting the provision of access
services: (a) Equipment requirement. The operator of each such system
shall have available equipment for local production and presentation of
cablecast programs other than automated services and permit its use for
the production and presentation of public access programs. The operator
of such system shall not enter into any contract, arrangement or lease for
the use of its cablecasting equipment which prevents or inhibits the use of
such equipment for a substantial portion of time for public access programming. (b) Program content control. The operator of each such system shall have no control over the content of access cablecast programs;
however, this limitation shall not prevent it from taking appropriate steps
to insure compliance with operating rules described in paragraph (d) of
this section.
47 C.F.R. § 76.256 (1978).
5. "In light of the hesitancy with which Congress approached the access issue in the broadcast area, and in view of its outright rejection of a broad right of
public accest on a common-carrier basis, we are constrained to hold that the Commission exceeded those limits in promulgation its access rules." 99 S. Ct. at 1445.
The Court supported its decision by emphasizing that previously:
Congress pointedly refrained from divesting broadcasters of their control over the selection of voices; § 3(h) of the Act stands as a firm Congressional statement that broadcast licensees are not to be treated as common
carriers, obliged to accept whatever is tendered by members of the public.
We now reaffirm that view of § 3(h): the purpose of the provision and its
mandatory wording preclude Commission discretion to compel broadcasters to act as common carriers, even with respect to a portion of their total
services.
Id. at 1444 n.15. See note 11 infra.
6. 99 S. Ct. at 1437. The Court limited its discussion solely to answering this
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The Court addressed two concerns in determining the scope of
the FCC's authority. The first concern was whether the FCC had
jurisdiction over cable systems. 7 The second question dealt with
the regulations requiring cable systems to assume common-carrier responsibilities. 8 With these two issues providing the determinative rationale, the Court, in a six to three decision, 9 decided
that the rules were not "reasonable ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting";10 and, therefore, were not
within the FCC's jurisdictional mandate."
FCCv. Midwest Video is significant insasmuch as it establishes
the Court's intention to prohibit further jurisdictional expansion
of the FCC over cable-an established and substantial communications medium of rapidly increasing importance.12 Furthermore,
main issue, refusing to discuss any of the other issues present. The Court stated
that:
The court below suggested that the Commission's rules might violate
the First Amendment rights of cable operators. Because our decision
rests on statutory grounds, we express no view on that question, save to
acknowledge that it is not frivolous and to make clear that the asserted
constitutional issue did not determine or sharply influence our construction of the statute. The Court of Appeals intimated, additionally, thatthe
rules might effect an "unconstitutional taking" of property or, by exposing
a cable operator to possible criminal prosecution for offensive cablecasting
by access users over which the operator has no control, might affront the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We forgo comment on these
issues as well.
Id. at 1446 n.19.
7. Id. at 1439. See also text accompanying note 8 infra.
8. 99 S. Ct. at 1441. See also text accompanying note 9 infra.
9. 99 S. Ct. at 1441. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. The majority opinion was filed by Justice
White, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist joined.
10. Id. at 1436 (quoting U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968)).
11. The Court felt that because the Communications Act prohibited the placement of common-carrier obligations on broadcasters, any attempt to do so was illegal. 99 S. Ct. at 1445. The Court based this decision on their interpretation of
§ 3(h) of the Communications Act which stated:
'Common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, except
where reference is made to common carriers not subject to this [Act]; but
a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is
so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-155 (1937)).
12. Current figures indicate that approximately 20% of the nation's population
is hooked up to over 4000 cable systems. Harwood, Tuning In On the New TV Technology, PLAYBOY, Oct. 1979, at 218. Many experts feel that the combination of

the case adamantly refused to impose common-carrier obligations,13 however slightly, on cable operators; and also demonstrated the necessity of immediate Congressional clarification
concerning the scope of the FCC's jurisdiction.14
This note will first examine the background and development of
the case; second, discuss and analyze the case and its implications; and finally, suggest that, in the future, less restrictive reasoning should be utilized when dealing with the perpetually
changing technological environment of cable television.

II. BACKGROUND
The foundation of the FCC's asserted jurisdiction over cable television is based on the Communications Act of 1934 (Act).' 5 The
statute, which remains essentially unchanged today,16 was
promulgated by Congress in order to regulate the rapidly accelerating technological capabilities of the broadcast industry. This
legislation was created for the purpose of "regulating interstate
and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as
to make available, so far as possible, to all people of the United
States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio
17
communications service."'
Understandably, the Act does not expressly provide for the regulation of cable, as cable was not introduced to any significant extent until the 1950's.18 However, as the Court emphasized in the
instant case,' 9 "it is clear that Congress meant to confer 'broad
authority' on the Commission" 20 in order to enable it to maintain
adequate control of the anticipated rapid evolution of communica2
tion technology. '
cable, pay, and home video tape will rapidly increase in importance, thus slashing
the amount of viewing Americans devote to the three major networks. Deeb, The
Man Who Destroyed Television, PLAYBOY, Oct. 1979, at 156.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. 99 S. Ct. at 1446. The Court stated: "We think authority to compel cable
operators to provide common carriage of public-originated transmissions must
come specifically from Congress."
15. Communication Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1937)).
16. Id. Congress recently amended the penalty provisions of the Act to apply
to cable operators. Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234,
§ 2, 92 Stat. 33 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2) (a) (iii)). See Comment, FCC
Regulation of Cable Television, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 204 n.6 (1979). See also M.
HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HAMBURG].
17. See note 2 supra. See text accompanying note 22.
18. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 162 n.12. "[Cable]
systems were evidently established on a noncommercial basis in 1949." Id.
19. 99 S. Ct. at 1439.
20. H.R. REP. No. 1858, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934). See note 60 infra.
21. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). This case dealt
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The broad wording of the Act is responsible for the controversy
surrounding the FCC's jurisdiction over cable. The Act specifies
communications by wire and radio as the objects of its authofity,
yet cable fits in neither of these categories. 2 2 Instead, cable systems are really a combination of both broadcasting and wire (telephone and telegraph) communications. Cable systems use wires
to transmit radio and television signals into the private homes of
23
their subscribers.
The cable industry grew out of the demands of viewers in re24
mote areas who, due to the distance from major urban centers,
25
were unable to receive adequate broadcast signals. At first the
FCC refused to subject cable to their authority in belief that the
industry was too undeveloped and localized to require supervision.26 The jurisdictional impetus, however, was provided by
the concern of the major networks over cable's penetration into
the established viewer market, thus motivating the FCC to re27
examine the scope of its jurisdiction over cable.
The networks argued that since the FCC had Congressional
with the various administrative proceedings involved in licensing a broadcast facility. The majority stated that: "The Communications Act is not designed primarily
as a new code for the adjustment of conflicting private rights through adjudication.
Rather, it expresses a desire on the part of Congress to maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission." Id. at 138.
22. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1937)). "The provisions of this Act shall apply to all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio ..
" See also D. PEMBER, MASS MEDiA LAW 430 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PEMBER].
23. Essentially there are three ways to get programs on the cable system:
1) to use an antenna that picks up signals from the air from conventional
television stations operating in the vicinity and transmit them along the
cable; 2) when the signals of stations are beyond the range of even the
most sophisticated antenna, to use an antenna closer to the desired signal
and transmit the signal by means of a long distance microwave or cable
link, which can be rented ... ; and 3) to transmit programs originated by
cable operators at their own studio facilities. This last process is called
cablecasting.
Comment, FCC Regulation of Cable Television, 54 N.Y.U. L REV. 205 n.12 (1979).
See also note 3 supra.
24. Cable systems supplement broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations in adjacent areas in which such reception would not otherwise be possible; and second, they may transmit distant signals to their
subscribers entirely beyond the range of local antennae. 392 U.S. at 163. See also
H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS CoMMumcATroNs 488 (3rd ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as NELSON & TEETER].
25. Id.
26. First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 709 (1965).
27. 392 U.S. at 164. "Thus, 'while the [cable] industry originated in sparsely

473

permission to regulate both broadcasting and wire communications, 28 it had the authority to regulate cable since it was essen29
tially a hybrid form of broadcasting and wire communications.
However, the FCC still refused to directly regulate the cable industry, adopting instead the alternative position that cable systems were "neither common-carriers nor broadcasters, and
therefore [were] within neither of the principle regulatory categories created by the Communications Act."30
The FCC's position that cable was outside its jurisdiction was
maintained until 1962. At that time the FCC performed an abrupt
about-face in the case of Carter Mountain,31 where they em32
braced a third position asserting indirect jurisdiction over cable.
The decision to assert limited control over cable reflected the
FCC's concern that microwave relay towers, over which it had authority, would be used to carry non-local programs into a community, thus possibly destroying a community's local television
33
service.
The FCC felt that public interest required the support of local
broadcasters and took affirmative actions to prevent these stations from being injured.34 "The FCC was well on its way to consettled areas and areas of adverse terrain... it is now spreading to metropolitan
centers. . . .'" Id. See also NELSON & TEETER, supra note 24, at 489.
28. See notes 2 and 22 supra. See generally PEMBER, supra note 22, at 430.
29. Id. See note 23 supra.
30. CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959). The Commission
also stated that it had not been given authority over "any and all enterprises
which happen to be connected with one of the many aspects of communications."
Id. at 429. See Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 254 (1958). The
Commission decided that since cable was neither a common carrier nor a broadcast system it could not directly regulate it.
31. In re Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), affd sub
nom., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 366 cert. denied,
375 U.S. 951 (1963).
32. Indirect jurisdiction is defined as the power of the FCC to issue permits to
construct microwave radio communication systems which transmit signals to community antenna systems (cable). The FCC has the authority to weigh the net effect upon the community to be served. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
§ 307(b), 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1936)). "The Commission shall carry into effect the equality of broadcasting service hereinbefore directed, whenever proper, by granting or refusing licenses or renewals of licenses
....
" Id. "Cable systems often use microwave relay towers to pick up television
signals and move them along to the cable system. This practice smacks of broadcasting and the FCC ruled that it has the power to deny a permit for a relay system if the existing broadcasting stations and thus the public interest will be
injured by increased competition from the cable system." PEMBER, supra note 22,
at 431.
33. The court concluded its discussion stating: "We think that the Commission justifiably concluded that the continuance of the local station served the public interest, and that it was fully warranted in imposing condition, designed to
protect that station .... " Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d
359, 366 (1963).
34. Id.
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trolling cable under the justification of serving the public interest
by protecting existing broadcasters from competition." 35
The FCC moved quickly to consolidate its newly acquired jtrisdiction over cable,36 and in 1966, extended to all cable systems
application of regulations previously restricted to a few such systems. 37 Although the increase in authority was challenged, the

Supreme Court, in 1968, agreed with the FCC that the expansion
was justified, thereby clearly establishing the authority of the
FCC to regulate cable. 38 The Court, through Mr. Justice Harlan,
stated that:
The commission has been charged with broad responsibilities for the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting.... The commission has reasonably found that the successful
performance of these duties demands prompt and efficacious regulation of
(cable systems]. We have elsewhere held that we may not, "in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress' intention ... prohibit administration action imperative for the achievement of an agency's
39
ultimate purpose ....

More importantly, the Court also established the standard to be
utilized in determining the allowable boundries of the FCC's jurisdiction. The Court held that the Act4O limited the authority of
the FCC to control cable to that which was "reasonably ancillary
to the effective performance of the Commission's various respon4
sibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." 1
When this case was handed down, the FCC reversed its position. It had maintained that the regulation of cable was necessary
in order to protect local broadcasters. The Commission changed
its rationale, asserting that regulation was necessary to improve
the nature of the communication media available to the public. 42
35. PEMBER, supra note 22, at 431.
36. NELSON & TEETER, supra note 24, at 489.
37. Second Report and Order on Microwave Served CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725
(1966). The FCC decided that the Act supplied sufficient power to enable it to regulate all cable systems. Id. at 728-34. It issued regulations governing the carriage
of local signals, the non-duplication of local programming, and prohibited the importation of distant signals into the one hundred largest television markets. Id. at
781-85. Thirteen days after the FCC adopted these rules, Southwestern Cable filed
a complaint challenging the authority of the FCC to promulgate such rules.
38. 392 U.S. at 157. The Court identified the issues as whether the FCC had
authority under the Act to regulate cable and, if it did, whether it had the authority to issue a prohibitory order. Id. at 167.
39. Id. at 177.
40. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-55 (1937)).
41. 392 U.S. at 178.
42. The goal of the FCC with regard to cable was stated as being to:

In order to effectuate this goal, the FCC issued regulations requir-

ing cable systems with 3500 or more subscribers to operate as a
local outlet by originating its own programs and providing facilities for local production and presentation. 43 As a result, cable

systems could no longer solely transmit other broadcasters' signals; they were now required to create local programming themselves. 44
In 1972, the validity of the new regulations was upheld by the
Court in a five-to-four decision. Four justices, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Brennan, concluded that the "reasonably ancillary"
standard 45 allowed the FCC to promulgate rules "with a view not
merely to protect but to promote the objectives for which the FCC

had been assigned jurisdiction over broadcasting."46 The justices
further held that the regulations were valid inasmuch as they
47
were within the reasonably ancillary standard.
[RJecognize the great potential of the cable technology to further the
achievement of long-established regulatory goals in the field of television
broadcasting by increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of
services ... [as] might best exploit cable channel capacity to the advantage of the public and promote the basic purpose for which this Commission was created: "regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and
worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities
at reasonable charges . ..."
U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 654-55 (1972) [hereinafter Midwest I].
43. The rules in question required: "[N]o CATV system having 3,500 or more
subscribers shall carry the signal of any television broadcast station unless the
system also operates to a significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting and
has available facilities for local production and presentation of programs other
than automated services." Id. at 653-54 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a)). Cablecasting was defined as "programming distributed on a CATV system which has been
originated by the CATV operator or by another entity, exclusive of broadcast signals carried on the system." Id. at 653 n.6 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 74.1101(j)). Note
that the FCC repealed these rules in 1974, explaining that:
Quality, effective, local programming demands creativity and interest.
These factors cannot be mandated by law or contract. The net effect of attempting to require origination has been the expenditure of large amounts
of money for programming that was, in many instances, neither wanted by
subscribers nor beneficial to the system's total operation.
99 S. Ct. at 1441 n.8 (1979) (quoting from Report and Order, 49 F.C.C. 2d 1090
(1974)).
44. PEMBER, supra note 22, at 432.
45. See note 41 supra, and accompanying text. In Midwest I, Justice Brennan
filed the majority opinion in which Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Burger joined. 406 U.S. at 650. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Id. at 677.
46. Id. at 667. See note 42 supra, for a statement of goals. The Court further
stated that: "The effect of the regulation, after all, is to assure that in the retransmission of broadcast signals viewers are provided with suitably diversified programming." Id. at 669.
47. Id. at 670. "In sum, the regulation preserves and enhances the integrity of
broadcast signals and therefore is 'reasonably ancillary' to the effective perform-
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Precedent established in cases dealing with the extent of the
FCC's authority had solidly established the FCC's jurisdiction
over cable. However, instead of pausing for a moment to observe
the effect of its new regulations, the FCC decided to continue expanding the scope of its authority in an attempt to further improve the communication facilities and opportunities available to
the public.48
In 1972, the FCC issued a comprehensive set of cable regulations entitled the Fourth Report and Order.49 This legislation, the
genesis of the rules now under scrutiny, imposed "mandatory access" regulations by requiring the top one hundred cable markets
to dedicate four of their channels for public, governmental, educational, and leased access.5 0
With the Fourth Report regulations providing the stimulus,
Midwest Video challenged the FCC,51 claiming the new rules violated the "reasonably ancillary" standard established in Southwestern.52 In 1978, the Eighth Circuit held that the controversial
regulations did indeed exceed the permissible boundries of the
FCC's authority.5 3 The court stated that:
[TIhe Commission has no jurisdiction within its statutory grant, under
the broadest view of the grant, to force free public access rules upon
broadcasters, or to make broadcasters into common carriers, power to impose such access rules on cable television systems cannot be reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's
various respon54
sibilities for regulation of television broadcasting.

Later that year the Supreme Court granted the FCC's petition
for certiorari5 5 and upheld the Eighth Circuit's determination that
ance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting."
48. See note 49 infra.
49. Fourth Report and Order on Cable Television Service, 37 Fed. Regs. 3251
(1972), modified, Cable Television Report and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 207 (1975) [hereinafter Fourth Report] (reflected a reassessment of the 1972 access regulations
and extended the compliance deadline from 1977 to 1986).
50. See note 4 supra, for the present rules in question which evolved from the
rules questioned in Midwest I.
51. 99 S. Ct. 1435 (1979).
52. See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
53. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), affid, 99 S. Ct.
1435 (1979) [hereinafter Midwest II].
54. 571 F.2d at 1040. The court concluded that the goal of access was created
by the FCC and therefore was not supported by any language of the Act or the
objectives endorsed by the Court in Midwest I. Id. at 1040-43. Chief Judge Markey
neatly summarized this conclusion by stating, "jurisdiction is not acquired
through visions of Valhalla." Id. at 1045.
55. 99 S. Ct. 77 (1978).

the access rules were not reasonably ancillary to the FCC's au56
thority.
III. THE CASE
The majority opinion in FCCv. Midwest Video Corp., identified
two interrelated issues as the underlying, determinative basis for
their decision that the 1972 mandatory access rules were not reasonably ancillary to the performance of the FCC's statutory duties. As previously discussed,5 7 the Court first questioned
whether the FCC had jurisdiction over cable; and if so, the extent
of that authority.58 The Court then considered whether the imposition of the access rules exceeded this jurisdiction by placing
59
common-carrier obligations on cable operators.
The Court's initial discussion of the jurisdictional question acknowledged that the FCC possessed jurisdiction over cable. The
Court based this conclusion on the series of cases, discussed
above, delineating the scope of the FCC's powers arising under
the Act. The Court noted that although the Act pre-dated the development of cable, Congress had intended the power to be flexibly wielded in order to satisfactorily control the unpredictable
directions of future communication advancements. 60
The Court then discussed the two contrasting jurisdictional is56. See text accompanying note 79 infra.
57. See 99 S. Ct. at 1439. See also text accompanying note 7 supra.
58. As the previous background discussion points out, it was fairly well established that the FCC did have jurisdiction over cable. The real question was
whether this jurisdiction was sufficient to permit the application of the Fourth Report regulations. See note 49 supra. In Midwest I, the Chief Justice wrote that, in
his opinion, the FCC's origination rules, "strains the outer limits" of the FCC's authority, and though not fully persuaded that the correct decision had been made,
decided to defer his judgment. 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972). See also note 43 supra, and
accompanying text.
59. 99 S. Ct. at 1441.
60. 99 S. Ct. at 1439. "But it is clear that Congress meant to confer 'broad authority' on the Commission." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
1 (1934)). Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Midwest I stated:
We cannot construe the Act so restrictively. Nothing in language of
12(a)], in the surrounding language, or in the Act's history or purposes
limits the Commission's authority to those activities and forms of communication that are specifically described by the Act's other provisions....
Certainly Congress could not in 1934 have foreseen the development of
community antenna television systems, but it seems to us that it was precisely because Congress wished "to maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission,"
that it conferred upon the Commission a "unified jurisdiction" and "broad
authority." Thus, underlying the whole Act is recognition of the rapidly
fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting and of
the corresponding requirement that the administrative process possess
sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors.
406 U.S. at 660-61. Note also that the FCC had asked Congress to issue appropriate
legislation in order to clarify its jurisdiction over cable. "Such legislation was in-
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sues presented by the case. 61 The FCC relied on Mr. Justice
Brennan's position in Midwest Video 1,62 that such regulations
would "further the achievement of long established regulatory
goals by increasing the number of outlets for commercial selfexpression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and
'63
types of services.
In opposition, the respondents attempted to show that the regulations deprived cable operators of editorial control by refusing to
grant them authority in the selection of the individual public
64
users or the type of programming chosen by these individuals.
Additionally, respondents claimed that the loss of editorial discretion represented, in effect, an attempt to impose common-carrier
regulations on the cable industry-a status the respondents hlleged was clearly prohibited by the Act.65
After considering both arguments, the Court endorsed Midwest
Video's position that the regulations violated the Act; adding, in
closing, that any future jurisdictional expansion or clarification
66
depended specifically upon Congressional action.
The crux of this decision was the Court's belief that the rules
imposed common-carrier obligations on cable operators. A cable
common-carrier was defined as one who "makes a public offering
to provide communication facilities whereby all members of the
public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or
67
transport intelligence of their own design and choosing."
troduced in the Senate in 1959, favorably reported, and debated on the Senate
floor. The bill was, however, ultimately returned to committee." 392 U.S. at 165.
61. 99 S. Ct. at 1441.
62. Id. See notes 42 and 43 supra, and accompanying text.
63. Id.
64. Id. Note also that the respondents (Midwest Video) argued that the access
regulations were an intrusion on cable system operations qualitatively different
from the impact of the rules upheld in Midwest I. Id. Midwest I dealt with regulations requiring cable operators to assume program origination responsibilities
similar to those imposed on TV broadcasters. 406 U.S. at 653-54. The present case
dealt with regulations requiring cable operators to provide designated channels
solely for the public use. See note 4 supra. The difference was that under the
prior origination rules the broadcaster still maintained editorial control. This enabled it to escape being labeled a common-carrier. 99 S. Ct. at 1441.
65. Id. at 1442. See also notes 5 and 11 supra. The Court noted that the FCC
itself had acknowledged that the access requirements compelled common-carrier
obligations. 99 S. Ct. at 1442.
66. Id. at 1446.
67. Id. at 1442. See also note 11 supra. The Act states that: "[N] othing in this
[act] shall be construed to apply or to give to the Commission jurisdiction with
respect to (1) charges . . . in connection with intrastate communication .....

In support of the conclusion that the rules imposed commoncarrier responsibilities, the Court focused on three particular elements of the regulations. 68 The Court appeared to equate the rule
requiring cable operators to provide designated channels on a
first come, nondiscriminatory basis with the section defining the
common-carrier as one who "makes a public offering to provide
*.".."69
communication facilities" to "all members of the public .
the
cable
rule
prohibiting
the
out
that
pointed
majority
Next, the
operator from asserting any editorial control over program content paralleled the definition's provision for allowing a member of
the public to transmit "intelligence of their own design and choosing."'70 As the final element, the Court noted that the rules prescribing what cable operators could legally charge for the use of
their equipment was consistent with the Act's definition of a com7
mon-carrier. 1
The majority reasoned that because the FCC was explicitly directed by the Act to not treat persons engaged in broadcasting as
common-carriers, any imposition of common-carrier obligations,
however limited, unequivocally exceeded the permissible bounda72
ries of the FCC's authority.
The majority then discussed the 1973 case of Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. DemocraticNational Committee7 3 in support of its position. CBS dealt with the question of whether a
broadcast licensee was required to accept paid editorial advertisements. 74 The Court held that the broadcasters could not be
forced to accept such advertisements, concluding that the broadcaster had broad editorial privileges 7 5 and that "Congress specifiCommunications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 2(b), 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47
U.S.C. § 152(b)).
68. See notes 4 and 11 supra, and accompanying text.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 1442.
70. Id. The Court also noted that a common-carrier does not "make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal." The majority then decided that the rules "plainly imposed common-carrier obligations on
cable operators." Id.
71. 99 S. Ct. at 1446. The FCC argued that no matter what characterization
was given to the rules, it had the authority to issue them as long as they promoted
the objectives of the FCC. See note 62 supra, and accompanying text. The Court
countered that the rules were invalid due to the strong legislative intent to prohibit the placement of any common-carrier obligations on broadcasters, supporting
with reference to the explicit order in the Act. See notes 5 and 11 supra.
72. Id.
73. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
74. Id. The case also stands for the proposition that the broadcaster's first
amendment rights are not absolute, but must be balanced against those of the
viewing public. Note, Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, The FirstAmendment Implications of Cable Access, 54 IND. L.J. 111 (1978).
75. 99 S. Ct. at 1445. The Court noted in support of its contention that the
cable operator was a broadcaster.
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cally dealt with-and firmly rejected-the argument that the
broadcast facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all
76
persons wishing to talk about public issues."
The majority, in the principal case, relied on the CBS opinion to
illustrate and strengthen its opinion that although the Act provided the FCC with broad supervisory powers, the FCC did not
have unlimited authority.77 On the contrary, the Court held that
Congress had intended to restrict the FCC's ability to pursue
goals of public access at the expense of the broadcaster's journalistic freedom. 7 8 The Court summarized its position by stating:
The language of section 3(h) is unequivocal; it stipulates that broadcasters shall not be treated as common carriers. As we see it, 3(h), consistently with the policy of the Act to perserve editorial control of
programming in the licensee, forecloses any discretion in the Commission
to impose access requirements amounting to common carrier obligations
on broadcast systems. The provision's background manifests a congressional belief that the intrusion worked by such regulations on the journalistic integrity of broadcasters would overshadow any benefits associated
with the resulting public access. It is difficult to deny, then, that forcing
broadcasters to develop a "nondiscriminatory system for controlling access . . 7. 9is precisely what Congress intended to avoid through § 3(h) of
the Act.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The holding announced in this case clearly illustrated the
Court's conviction that section 3(h) of the Act represented a
strong Congressional intent to prohibit the imposition of commoncarrier obligations on broadcasters. As a result, the Court felt it
had no other choice than to rule that the regulations violated the
That limitation is not one having peculiar applicability to television
broadcasting. Its force is not diminished by the variant technology involved in cable transmissions. Cable operators now share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding what their
programming will include. As the Commission, itself, has observed, "both
in their signal carriage decisions and in connection with their origination
function, cable television systems are afforded considerable control over
the content of the programming they provide."
The Court also noted that because Congress had restricted the FCC's ability to advance objectives associated with public access at the expense of the journalistic
freedom of persons engaged in broadcasting, the controversial access rules were
necessarily void. Id.
76. 412 U.S. at 105.
77. 99 S. Ct. at 1444. The Court also pointed out that the only limitation on
cable systems came about through the FCC's power over broadcasting and not by
a stipulation in the Act. Id.
78. Id. at 1445.
79. Id. at 1444.

Act and therefore, could not possibly be reasonably ancillary to
the FCC's duties.80
The Court viewed its responsibility as to enforce the Act, not to
create new legislation. Consequently, as a direct result of the
Act's language prohibiting the placement of common-carrier obligations on broadcasters, the Court was unable to consider the potential usefulness and desirability of such regulations. Simply
stated, the Court's hands were tied.
In closing, the Court acknowledged the dilemma raised by its
decision. 81 As a result, it requested the aid of Congress in adopting additional, clarifying legislation.82 The Court apparently believed that without the FCC providing direction in the area of
cable television, given its unpredictable future advances, a vacuum of control could result-possibly one ill-equipped to deal adequately with the challenges presented by modern technology.
Because the Act provided sufficient evidence of the intent of Congress to establish controls on the communications industry, 83 the
Court felt it was up to the Legislature to revise the Act in order to
allow the FCC to pursue new directions. 84 The burden of clarification now rested squarely upon the shoulders of Congress.
There are several main policy areas which should be considered
in determining the desirability of access rules. These policy areas
will be examined from a historical perspective, as well as their
likely future impact to provide assistance in evaluating the propriety of the regulations.
The first area of discussion considers the possibility that some
of the factors the Court previously found persuasive in validating
the Fairness Doctrine might also be used to support the validity
of the questioned cable access rules. 8 5
80. Id. See also notes 6 and 11 supra.

81. The Court noted that the series of previous cases had generally endorsed
the power of the FCC to promulgate rules related to reaching its goals of increased
outlets and diversified programming and that it might be possible in the future to
devise an acceptable access obligation. Nonetheless, the Court felt duty bound to
uphold the law as contained in the Act unless, and until, Congress decided to
otherwise declare such regulations were permissible.
82. 99 S. Ct. at 1446. However, 'note that the dissent asserted that since Congress had chosen not to enter the controversy, this should be interpreted as signaling Congress' desire to leave questions such as these to the experienced judgment
of the FCC. Id. at 1448.
83. Id. at 1445. The Court stated that it was "unable to ignore Congress' stern
disapproval evidenced in § 3(h) of negation of the editorial discretion

...

"

Id. at

1445.
84. Id. at 1448.
85. The Fairness Doctrine was first recognized in 1949. In re Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Under this doctrine, the broadcaster
must give coverage to public issues, and the coverage must be fair. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969).
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The Fairness Doctrine requires broadcasters to devote a reasonable percentage of their possible "air" time to the coverage of
public issues, 8 6 and also requires the coverage be fairly balanced.87 In 1969, these requirements were upheld by the Court.88
The Court ruled that inasmuch as a limited number of channels
were available, the impossibility of allowing everyone who desired to broadcast necessitated extensive regulation.8 9 In recognizing the broadcaster's right to editorial control, the ruling
further extended the public's right to an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas," and that "it is the right of the viewer and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 90 As a
result of this reasoning, the Court decided that the FCC was justified in infringing on the broadcaster's rights in order to insure the
exposure of contrasting viewpoints. 91
This position was reaffirmed by the Court in the 1972 CBS
case 92 when it continued to emphasize the position that the rights
of the public took precedence and that the need for balanced
presentation of public issues was satisfied only when everything
86. See note 85 supra. See also PEMBER, note 22 supra, at 417. Of primary concern is public affairs programming and controversial public issues. Id. "Thirty
years of consistent administrative construction left undisturbed by Congress until
1959, when that construction was expressly accepted, reinforce the natural conclusion that the public interest language of the Act authorized the Commission to require licensees to use their stations for discussion of public issues ... " 395 U.S.
367, 382 (1969).

87.

PEMBER,

note 22 supra, at 415.

88. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Fairness Doctrine regulations are found in 32 Fed.
Reg. 10303, amended, 32 Fed. Reg. 11531, 33 Fed. Reg. 5362.
89. The unanimous Court strongly emphasized the scarcity of broadcast channels as one basis of the FCC's authority to regulate in this area. Note, Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC; The FirstAmendment Implications of Cable Television Access,
54 IND. L.J. 109, 110 (1978). An important question is how the Court circumvented
Congress' prohibition of imposing common-carrier obligations on broadcasters. In
answering this question, the Court stated that: "Certainly, our construction of
§ 3(h) does not put into question the statutory authority for the fairness doctrine
obligations sustained in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC, . . . The fairness doctrine does not require that a broadcaster provide common carriage; meeting fairness doctrine obligations the 'licensee will in each instance be called upon to
exercise his best judgment and good sense in determining what subjects should
be considered, the particular format of the programs to be presented, and the
spokesmen for each point of view.'" 99 S. Ct. 1444 n.14 (1979) (citations omitted).

90. 395 U.S. at 390. The Court noted that it was the purpose of the first amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace where the truth would always prevail. Id.
91. Note, Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC: The FirstAmendment Implications of
Cable Television Access, 54 IND. L.J. 109, 110 (1978).
92. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) [hereinafter CBS].

of importance had been said.93 In conclusion, the Court noted
that although broadcasters could not be forced to accept paid political advertisements, the FCC might, in the future, "devise some
kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable."

94

A second area of concern regards the possibility that the access
rules could potentially impose too great a financial burden on the
cable operators. As noted, the original access rules required certain cable systems to develop a twenty channel capacity with four
of those channels reserved for public access. 95 Realizing that
these regulations could cause unjustified economic hardships on
cable, the FCC decided to amend the rules in order to make them
more reasonable. 96 These 1976 amendments extended the compliance deadline to 1986, providing that until public demand existed
for all four access channels, the cable operator could limit his operation to fewer channels, and that if the cable system had insufficient channels operating, it could satisfy the access requirement97
by providing portions of the available channels for access use.
These changes, accompanied by the statute which limited the application of these rules to the larger cable systems, 98 significantly
alleviated the potential economic burden on cable operators.
A third area affecting the determination of the desirability of access requirements, is the advisability of further governmental involvement with a private industry. Presently the government,
through the FCC, is heavily involved with the regulation of onechannel broadcasters in order to insure that crucial public issues
are presented and representative viewpoints exposed.99 This reg93. Id. at 122.
94. Id. at 131.
95. The original access rules questioned in Midwest I required all cable operators in the top 100 television markets to design their systems to include at least
twenty channels and to dedicate four of those channels for public, governmental,
educational, and leased access. See note 4 supra.
96. Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
97. (b) Until such time as there is demand for each channel full time for
its designated use, public, educational, governmental, leased access channel programming may be combined on one or more cable channels. To the
extent time is available therefor, access channels may also be used for
other broadcast and nonbroadcast service except that at least one channel
shall be maintained exclusively for the presentation of access programming as required ....
(c) if insufficient activated channel capacity is available to provide one full
channel for shared access programming the system operator shall provide
whatever portions of channels are available for such purposes.
47 C.F.R. § 76.254 (1976).
98. The limitation to systems having 3500 or more subscribers insures that the
cable operator will have sufficient income to provide the necessary facilities and
equipment modifications. Also, since the rules require cable operators to build expandable systems, this may save the operator future expense.
99. See note 85 supra. Although the FCC does no monitoring of the stations
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ulation is necessary due to one-channel systems providing a limited amount of time for the discussion of public issues. As a
result of there being a limited amount of time available, it is conceivable that the only viewpoint presented would be that of the
station's management. Because of this possibility, the FCC is
continually having to monitor different stations throughout the
country in order to insure that they are satisfying the balanced
presentation requirements of the Fairness Doctrine.
However, with regard to cable systems, such involvement would
be unnecessary if the mandatory public access requirements
were imposed on cable systems. The rules were designed to guarantee that the public received diverse programming by providing
free access to anyone who wished to speak on an issue. 0 0 The
availability of free television exposure would undoubtedly provide an irresistible lure, thus encouraging the expression of a
multitude of differing viewpoints.
The result would be that the government would not have to
monitor cable systems in order to insure that they were complying with the Fairness Doctrine. This would considerably reduce
the amount of possible governmental involvement and, as a direct
consequence, cause a reduction in the amount of governmental
expenditures.
The fourth area concerns the definition of a common-carrier. A
common-carrier, in a communications context, is generally defined as any communication facility which allows any member of
the public to freely broadcast upon demand.' 0 ' With television
and radio broadcasters, such a definition made sense and, taken
in light of the accompanying prohibitory legislation, is clearly justified. Broadcast systems which only possess one channel on
which to transmit must, out of necessity, be provided with broad
editorial powers over the type and origin of programming broadcasted over its sole channel. To allow the imposition of nondiscriminatory public access requirements would place obvious and
potentially crippling burdens on the broadcaster and, foreseeably,
for violations of the Fairness Doctrine, it does adjudicate the validity of viewer
complaints. In 1973, approximately 2400 complaints were received. PEMBER, supra
note 22, at 422.
100. The idea is that if there was not a scarcity of channels, then diversity
would develop naturally. In CBS, Justice Stewart stated that it was the scarcity of
channels which necessitated regulation in order to guarantee diverse programming. 412 U.S. at 135 (1973).
101. See note 67 supra.

allow such a one-channel system to become monopolized by the
02
wealthy and influential.
In contrast, the cable industry currently possesses the technological capability to install as many as eighty channels. 103 For the
future, technophiles predict that, with the advent of laser-ray carriage of television signals, cable systems will have a virtually unlimited quantity of channels,10 4 although most cable systems
presently begin with only twelve channels.
Since the access requirements only pertain to a maximum of
four channels out of twenty, a simple computation confirms that,
at the most, 20% of the system's potential would be affected by
the access requirements, thus leaving the cable operator with
control of not less than 80% of possible "air" time.
If a one-channel broadcaster was required to reserve 20% of the
channel's possible "air time" for public access, the channel could
theoretically lose one-fifth of its present revenue production capability. Broadcasters generally rely on commercials to generate
their income. Consequently, a decrease in the number of commercials shown causes a decrease in the amount of income realized. Conceivably the broadcaster could produce the same level
of revenue by increasing the frequency or length of commercial
breaks by 20%. However, a possible result of such an action
would be the alienation of viewers unaccustomed to the increase
in commercial time.
In contrast, if a cable system reserved four out of twenty channels for public access, it would still be able to provide sixteen
other channels for private commercial use. Simply stated, the
cable systems could more easily accommodate the access requirements without the threat of diminished income.
However, the majority, in Midwest Video, ruled that although
these regulations conceivably created only a limited common-carrier obligation, they had to be equated with the establishment of
complete common-carrier responsibilities because the Act prohib05
ited common-carrier duties in any form.
The more realistic position in the future would be to interpret
the access obligation as creating a limited common-carrier status; 1 06 one that pertains to only a small portion of cable's total
102. 412 U.S. at 123 (1973).
103. The cable industry now possesses the technology to allow the conveyance
of up to 40 channels through a single cable. This capability could easily be increased to 80 channels. See note 16 supra, at 206 n.22.
104. See Field, Laser Video Is Intriguing,But Is It Useful?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18,
1972, at 37, col. 3.
105. See note 78 supra, and accompanying text.
106. By "limited common-carrier" responsibilities, it is meant that a broad-
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service capability. This construction would recognize the obvious
differences between broadcasters with only one channel, and
cable, with a potentially unlimited channel capacity.
The final area of consideration involves the trend of previous
cases questioning the extent of FCC jurisdiction. It has been indicated above that as early as 1968, the Court recognized that the
FCC had the authority to regulate cable. 07 Subsequent cases
steadily expanded the scope of this jurisdiction.108 The Court
held that the FCC had sufficient authority to regulate cable television "with a view not merely to protect, but to promote the objectives for which the Commission had been assigned jurisdiction
over broadcasting."' 0 9 Although the Court's decision in Midwest
Video invalidated the access rules because they imposed common-carrier obligations, the rules were nonetheless designed to
promote the objectives of the FCC by establishing more outlets
for community expression and also increasing the diversity of
programming." 0
Mr. Justice Stevens pointed this out in his dissenting opinion in
which he criticized the Court for substituting its own judgment
for that of the FCC, emphasizing that "the point is that Congress
has chosen to leave such questions with the Commission to which
it has given the flexibility to experiment with new ideas as changing conditions require.""' This policy will undoubtedly be influcaster could conceivably be deemed a common-carrier with respect to only a por-

tion of its service capability, e.g., cable where there could possibly be thousands of
channels within one cable service and only two or three of these channels would

be reserved for common-carrier duty. Note also that Circuit Judge Wilkey recognized this contention as a viable option when he stated in his opinion: "Since it is
clearly possible for a given entity to carry on many types of activities, it is at least
logical to conclude that one can be a common carrier with regard to some activities but not others." National Association of Regulatory Commissioners v. FCC,
174 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 381, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Court could, in
the future, hold that the reasoning employed to justify the prohibition of commoncarrier status on television and radio is not logically transferrable to cable. The
House of Representatives acknowledged this possibility in 1975 by approving of
one full-access channel and one leased access channel, but questioned the value
of two other channels in view of the costs to the cable operators. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CABLE TELEVISION: PROMISE VERSUS REGULATORY

PERFORMANCE 9 (Subcomm. Print 1976).

107. U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
108. U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).

109. Id. at 667. See note 46 supra.
110. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
111. 99 S. Ct. at 1448 (1979). The dissent also claimed that the majority had
ministerpreted the meaning of the common-carrier statute contained in the Act.

ential in any future consideration concerning the validity of cable
access requirements.
V.

CONCLUSION

The FCC, in order to effectively fulfill its statutory responsibilities, must be afforded a broad and flexible base of authority in order to satisfactorily cope with the incredible growth of modern
telecommunication technology. Earlier cases recognized this as a
valid and necessary requirement. In Midwest Video, however, the
Court held that the access rules in question impermissibly extended the statutory boundries of the FCC's jurisdiction by placing common-carrier obligations on cable-a status the Court felt
was clearly prohibited by the Act.
Recognizing the need for reappraisal, the Court asked Congress
to provide additional legislation in order to provide better guidance for the courts, and to match present needs and technological capabilities in a meaningful and beneficial manner. Thus, the
real issue submitted is whether the access rules should be permitted in future legislation.
The answer appears to be in the affirmative. The involvement
of the government in broadcasting and the Fairness Doctrine's
imposition on broadcast regulations supports this contention.
The fact that previous cases have consistently expanded the
scope of the FCC's authority, going as far as recognizing the possibility of future access requirements is also supportive of this
reasoning. Additionally, the FCC has usually been allowed to
promulgate and apply its own policies unless they were clearly illegal. The steps taken by the FCC to insure that the rules will not
become too burdensome from a financial viewpoint, provides additional support for the possibility of future access rules. Finally,
the uniqueness of cable, with its unlimited channel capability,
largely destroys the validity of the rationale for prohibiting the
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, stated that there was nothing in the
statute or its history which the exercise of powers otherwise within its statutory
authority because a "lawfully imposed requirement might be termed a 'common
carrier obligation.'" Id. at 1447. Justice Stevens thought that the Court should follow the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution unless there
were compelling indications that it was incorrect. Id. Chief Justice Burger commented in Midwest I: "I am not fully persuaded that the Commission has made
But the scope of our review is limited and
the correct decision in this case ....
does not permit me to resolve this issue as perhaps I would were I a member of
the Federal Communications Commission. That I might take a different position
as a member of the Commission gives me no license to do so here. Congress has
created its instrumentality to regulate broadcasting, has given it pervasive powers,
and the Commission has generations of experience and 'feel' for the problem. I
therefore conclude that until Congress acts, the Commission should be allowed
" 406 U.S. at 676.
wide latitude ....
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placement of common-carrier requirements on broadcasters. The
total of all these considerations clearly points to the conclusion
that the effects of the mandatory cable access regulations are
outside the type of occurrence Congress intended to prohibit.
As the Court stated, "conceivably at some future date Congress
or the Commission-or the broadcasters-may devise some kind
of limited right of access that is both practicable and desira112
ble."
ROBERT L. CLARKSON

112. 99 S. Ct. 1435, 1444 (1979).

